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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
ALBERT JOHN and ANGELA ) 
BUTTERFIELD, as guardian and ) 
parents of and on behalf of ) 
TIFFANY RUTH BUTTERFIELD, ) 
Plaintiffs/Petitioners, ) 
) DC C86-9250 
vs. ) CA 880347-CA 
) SC 900272 
DAVID OKUBO, THOMAS NICKOL, ) 
and HOLY CROSS JORDAN VALLEY ) 
HOSPITAL, JOHN DOES 1-5, ) Priority No. 13 
Defendants/Respondents. ) 
RESPONDENT, DR. THOMAS NICKOL#S, BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether petitioner's Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari is untimely and therefore should be denied. 
2. Whether petitioner's Petition comports with 
Rule 46 regarding considerations governing review of certiorari. 
3. Whether the Court of Appeals properly 
affirmed the District Court's Order of Dismissal on the basis 
that Petitioners failed to establish a prima facie case that 
Dr. Nickol's conduct was a proximate cause of Tiffany 
Butterfield's death. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2-2(5) to review the Utah Court of Appeals decision 
filed on March 28, 1990. On April 27, 1990, the Petitioners 
were granted an extension of time and ordered to file their 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari by May 28, 1990. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
Rules 45, 46, 47, 48 and 49 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure (1990). Because of the length of the text 
of the rules each has been reproduced in its entirety in the 
Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Action. 
The above-captioned lawsuit is a wrongful death 
malpractice action against Thomas E. Nickol, M.D., 
(hereinafter "Dr. Nickol") and other named defendants. 
Petitioners Albert John and Angela Butterfield (hereinafter 
"the Butterfields") filed their Complaint against Dr. 
Nickol on September 19, 1986. (Record on Appeal [R.] at 
pp. 2-5.) More than a year after the Complaint was filed, 
Dr. Nickol filed a Motion for Summary Judgment dismissal of 
the Complaint on the grounds that the Butterfields had failed 
to produce the requisite medical expert testimony necessary to 
prove their medical malpractice claims at trial. (R. 131-132, 
145-168) Respondents Dr. David Okubo and Holy Cross Jordan 
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Valley Hospital also filed Motions for Summary Judgment. (R. 
66-67, 73-103) . After hearing oral arguments on December 23, 
1987 Judge Richard H. Moffat ruled in favor of respondents/ 
Motions. (See, Order and Summary Judgment attached hereto at 
Addendum "A.") The Butterfields appealed the Court's Order 
granting summary judgment and the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
lower court's decision on March 28, 1990. (See, Opinion of 
the Utah Court of Appeals attached hereto at Addendum "B.") 
Thereafter, the Butterfields filed their Motion to 
Enlarge Time to File Petition for Writ of Certiorari which was 
granted*on April 27, 1990, and permitted petitioners until 
May 28, 1990 to file their Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
(See, Order for Enlargement of Time to File Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari attached hereto at Addendum "C") On May 29, 
1990, petitioners filed their Petition For Writ of Certiorari 
with the Utah Supreme Court. Counsel for Dr. Nickol received 
Petitioners' Petition For Writ of Certiorari on June 5, 1990. 
The Petition was unsigned and attached Certificate of Service 
was neither dated nor signed. (See, Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, attached hereto at Addendum "D.") 
B. Statement of the Facts. 
This is a medical malpractice case based upon the 
alleged failure of Dr. Nickol, an emergency room physician, 
and others to diagnose and treat breathing problems which 
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allegedly caused petitioners7 minor child, Tiffany Ruth 
Butterfield, to die of sudden infant death syndrome 
(SIDS). 
Tiffany was born to Albert John and Angela 
Butterfield on June 30, 1984, at Holy Cross Jordan Valley 
Hospital. (R. at p. 2.) On July 4, 1984, three days after 
Tiffany was discharged from the hospital, the Butterfields 
brought Tiffany to the emergency room at Holy Cross Jordan 
Valley Hospital. Dr. Nickol was the emergency room physician 
on duty that evening. Mrs. Butterfield told Dr. Nickol 
that Tiffany seemed congested and was having some trouble 
breathing. (Dr. Nickol's Deposition pp. 18-19 attached 
hereto at Addendum "E," and Mrs. Butterfield's Deposition, 
p. 26 attached hereto at Addendum "F.") 
After reassuring himself that Tiffany's condition 
did not demand immediate medical attention, Dr. Nickol 
consulted with Tiffany's pediatrician, Dr. Okubo, to ask 
whether he would like to come into the emergency room and 
examine Tiffany or whether he would prefer that Dr. Nickol 
do the examination. (Dr. Nickol's Deposition, pp. 26, 
41-44.) Dr. Okubo approved Dr. Nickol's examination of 
Tiffany over the telephone. (Dr. Nickol's Deposition, 
p. 26) 
After completing his discussion with Dr. Okubo and 
his examination of Tiffany, Dr. Nickol indicated to Mr. and 
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Mrs. Butterfield that Tiffany needed no treatment that 
evening for her congestion, and that the Butterfields should 
take Tiffany to see Dr. Okubo the next morning for a 
follow-up examination. (Dr. Nickol's Deposition, p. 26,) 
On August 16, 1984, at approximately 8:00 p.m., 
Mr. and Mrs. Butterfield again took Tiffany to the 
emergency room at Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital. 
(Mrs. Butterfield's Deposition at pp. 40-41, 46,) 
Dr. Nickol was again on duty as the emergency room 
physician. (Dr. Nickol's Deposition, p. 27,) The emergency 
room hospital records from Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital 
for the evening of August 16, 1984, indicate that 
Mrs. Butterfield told Dr. Nickol that Tiffany had been 
experiencing breathlessness and irregular breathing. As with 
Tiffany's visit to the emergency room on July 4, 1984, 
Dr. Nickol was not able to detect any medical condition on 
August 16, 1984 for which Tiffany required immediate medical 
attention, and Tiffany was discharged from the emergency room 
that evening. (Dr. Nickol's Deposition, p. 29.) This was 
the last time Dr. Nickol saw the child. 
On August 31, 1984, the Butterfields took Tiffany 
to Dr. Monte McClellan, a family practitioner, for a 
routine checkup. Dr. McClellan again saw Tiffany on 
September 27, November 5, November 30, and December 14, 1984. 
(Dr. McClellan deposition, pp. 7-11 attached hereto at 
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Addendum flG.lf) On December 20, 1984, Tiffany died from 
Sudden Infant Syndrome (SIDS). 
After filing their Complaint against Respondents, the 
Butterfield's allegedly retained Dr. McClellan to give 
expert testimony at trial as to the improper conduct of 
respondents in this case. (Answer to Defendants' First Set of 
Interrogatories, Interrogatory Answer No. 11, attached at 
Addendum "H.") This representation was made on April 7, 
1987. However, during his deposition taken on October 1, 1987, 
Dr. McClellan indicated that he had, at no time, been 
retained as an expert by petitioners to testify in this case. 
(Dr. McClellan's Deposition, p. 47.) Petitioners eventually 
admitted, at the summary judgment hearing, they did not intend 
to rely upon Dr. McClellan to provide them with the medical 
expert testimony necessary to prove their medical malpractice 
claims at trial. (See, Transcript of the Summary Judgment 
Hearing at R. 212.) 
Counsel for Dr. Nickol secured the expert opinion 
of Dr. Michael C. Pinell, M.D., a Utah board certified family 
practitioner and emergency medicine physician. After reviewing 
the emergency room medical records of Tiffany Butterfield 
from Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital for the dates of July 4, 
1984, and August 14, 1984, Dr. Pinell concluded that 
Dr. Nickol7s examination and treatment of Tiffany 
Butterfield was "within the standard of care required of 
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physicians specializing in emergency medicine". (See, 
Affidavit attached hereto at Addendum "I.11) 
On December 29, 1987, Dr. Nickol, filed his Motion 
for Summary Judgment on the grounds that the Butterfields had 
failed to procure the requisite medical expert testimony 
necessary to prove their medical malpractice claims at trial. 
This Motion came on for hearing before Judge Moffat on 
December 23, 1987, and additional argument pertaining to all 
respondents' Motions for Summary Judgment was heard on 
January 4, 1988. 
At the December 23, 1987 hearing, the Butterfields 
argued that the case should not be dismissed for lack of 
medical expert testimony since petitioners had procured the 
testimony of H. Barry Jacobs, M.D. (R. at 212.) 
Dr. Jacobs7 affidavit was submitted to the court for 
consideration on the day of the hearing. (See, Dr. Jacobs' 
Affidavit attached hereto at Addendum "J.") After reviewing 
the affidavit, the Court concluded the affidavit was improperly 
filed and provided insufficient proof that Dr. Jacobs was 
qualified to testify to the standard of care for emergency room 
physicians such as Dr. Nickol. (See. Transcript of Summary 
Judgment Hearing at R. 212). 
Once the Court had entertained all arguments 
pertinent to the Motions for Summary Judgment, the Court 
granted Respondents' Motions on January 27, 1988 and 
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specifically found that Respondents "were not a proximate cause 
of the infant plaintiff's death inasmuch as there were 
intervening events that superseded any misconduct on the part 
of said defendants". (See. Order and Summary Judgment 
attached hereto at Addendum "A.") 
The Butterfield's appealed the lower Court's Order 
granting summary judgment. The Court of Appeals heard oral 
argument on January 26, 1990 and affirmed the lower court's 
decision on March 28, 1990. (See, Opinion, Utah Court of 
Appeals attached hereto at Addendum "B.") 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
PETITIONERS' PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS 
UNTIMELY AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE DENIED. 
Rule 48 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
(1990), provide that, "A petition for a writ of certiorari must 
be filed with the clerk of the Supreme Court within thirty 
days after the entry of the decision by the court of appeals." 
It further states that the Supreme Court may extend the time 
for filing. In this case, the Court of Appeals7 opinion was 
filed on March 28, 1990. On April 27, 1990, Petitioners7 
attorney submitted his Motion for Enlargement of Time to File 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. On April 27, 1990, Supreme 
Court Justice Richard C. Howe granted Petitioners7 Motion and 
ordered that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari be filed on 
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May 28, 1990. The Petition was not filed until May 29, 1990. 
(See, Petition Cover, attached at Addendum "D.") 
In Galleaos v. Midvale Citv. 492 P.2d 1335 
(Utah 1972), the Court stated, "[0]ne of the primary purposes 
and most important attributes of the laws is that there be a 
system of rules which have solidarity and continuity so that 
people can know what the law is and place reliance thereon and 
govern themselves accordingly." 492 P.2d at 1338. See 
also, Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934 (Utah 
1980). In this instance, even though Petitioners were granted 
an extension of time to file their Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari they still failed to file their brief in a timely 
manner. Therefore, in accordance with the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, their Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
should be denied. 
POINT II 
PETITIONERS' PETITION DOES NOT COMPORT WITH ANY OF THE 
CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING REVIEW OF CERTIORARI AS SET 
FORTH IN RULE 46 OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE (1990) 
Petitioners, in their Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, list the following three questions for review: 
(1) Did plaintiff establish the requisite 
causal link between the treatment rendered 
by defendants to the death of the minor 
child? 
(2) Was proximate causation called into 
question by defendants in moving for 
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summary judgment sufficiently to require 
plaintiffs to come forward with evidence of 
the causal link between the purported 
malpractice and harm for which the 
plaintiffs sought damages? 
(3) Did the court improperly rule on lack 
of proximate cause when the lower court 
ruled on the issue of proximate causation 
only from the prospective that intervening 
events occurred superseding any misconduct 
on the part of the defendants? 
Rule 49(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
(1990) states that a petition for writ of certiorari shall 
contain with respect to each question presented, "a direct and 
concise argument explaining the special and important reasons 
as provided in Rule 46 for the issuance of the writ." In this 
case, petitioners make no reference to Rule 46 nor does their 
petition comport with any of the stated considerations 
governing review of certiorari as set forth in Rule 46. 
In Lee v. Provo City Civil Service Commission, 582 
P.2d 485 (Utah 1978), the Court stated: 
It has long been the law in this 
jurisdiction that pleadings seeking relief 
by way of certiorari must specifically 
designate the jurisdictional excess or 
abuse of discretion claimed and that 
pleadings which merely set forth 
conclusions are to be dismissed. The 
reasoning behind the rule is simple. In 
the absence of specific allegations, the 
nature and extent of the review ceases to 
be limited and invites the court to 
substitute its judgment for that of the 
inferior tribunal, board or officer. 
Id. at p. 486. (emphasis added). 
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In the instant case, it was incumbent upon the 
petitioners to plead in accordance with Rule 46 exactly what 
jurisdictional excess they believe the Court to have abused. 
Since the petitioners failed to do so, there is essentially 
nothing for the Court to review and their Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari should be denied. 
POINT III 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY 
AFFIRMED THE LOWER COURT'S ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL ON THE BASIS THAT PETITIONERS 
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT DR. NICKOL'S 
CONDUCT PROXIMATELY CAUSED TIFFANY BUTTERFIELD'S DEATH 
A. Petitioners Failed to Establish a Prima 
Facie Case that Dr. Nickol Caused Tiffany Butterfield/s 
Death. 
In medical malpractice cases, the plaintiff has the 
burden to prove that the defendant proximately caused the 
injury. Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 354 n. 17 (Utah 
1980) and Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health Care. 740 P.2d 
270, 271 (1987). "In the absence of evidence, there is nothing 
upon which a jury can base its findings on the proximate cause 
of the injury." Huaains v. Hicken, 310 P.2d 523, 526 (Utah 
1957). "The evidence must be substantial and must . . . have 
foundation in expert medical testimony." (Id., footnotes 
omitted). 
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In the present case, the undisputed facts are that 
Tiffany Butterfield died of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome 
(SIDS) on December 20, 1984, more than four months after she 
last saw Dr. Nickol in the emergency room on August 16, 
1984. During that four-month period of time, the 
Butter:ields took Tiffany to Dr. Monte McClellan, a 
family practitioner, on at least five different occasions, 
including August 31, September 27, November 5, November 30 and 
December 14, 1984, for routine care. 
In Mitchell v. Pearson Enter.. 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 
1985), the Court defined proximate cause as follows: 
That cause which in natural and continuous 
sequence, (unbroken by an efficient and 
intervening cause), produces the injury and 
without which the result would not have 
occurred. It is the efficient cause — the 
one that necessarily sets in operation the 
factors that accomplish the injury. 
Id. at 245-246 (footnotes omitted). 
As stated above, Dr. Nickol had not seen or cared for 
Tiffany Butterfield for over a four month period of time prior 
to her death. This rather lengthy period of time logically 
insulates Dr. Nickol as the efficient cause of her death. 
Further, the Butterfields are unable to establish a natural 
and continuous sequence of events occurring from the time Dr. 
Nickol last saw Tiffany until the time of her death since she 
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was seen and treated on at least five separate occasions by Dr. 
McClellan during that time. 
It is generally true that the issue of proximate 
cause is almost always a factual issue and in most 
circumstances cannot be resolved as a matter of law. Apache 
Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614 (Utah 1985). 
However, in certain circumstances where the evidence is such 
that a jury can do no more than guess or conjecture as to which 
of several acts, conditions or agencies was in fact the 
efficient cause of the plaintiff's injuries, it is for the 
Court to decide as a matter of law that plaintiff's case has 
not been established. Thomas Helicopters, Inc. v. San Tan 
Ranches. 633 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Idaho 1981). See, also, 
Thompson v. Presbyterian Hospital, Inc., 652 P.2d 260 
(Okla. 1982) (proximate cause becomes a question of law when 
there is no evidence from which a jury could reasonable find a 
causal nexus between the negligent act and the resulting 
injury.); McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 
1983) (question of whether proximate cause exists is one for 
trier of fact unless evidence shows that reasonable persons 
could not disagree). 
Petitioners argue that Dr. H. Barry Jacobs' 
affidavit presents a question of fact. However, the only 
statement Dr. Jacobs makes in regard to proximate cause is 
that, in his opinion, the care provided by respondents 
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constitutes care below the accepted standard and "was the 
proximate cause of the child's demise from SIDS." 
Dr. Jacobs7 statement is conclusory and unsupported by the 
facts. He makes no attempt in his affidavit to explain events 
which occurred between the time Tiffany last saw Dr. Nickol 
and the time she died four months later nor does he explain 
what effect Dr. McClellan's care may have had on Tiffany 
prior to her death. Finally, Dr. Jacobs neglects to mention 
the fact that the Butterfields failed to take Dr. Nickol7s 
advice to take their child for follow-up visits to their family 
physician on each of the days immediately following Tiffany's 
emergency room visits. 
The Butterfields have simply failed to establish 
the requisite causal link between Dr. Nickol's conduct and 
Tiffany Butterfield's death. The affidavit of Dr. Jacobs 
is insufficient to create a natural and continuous sequence of 
events connecting Dr. Nickol#s care to Tiffany's death. 
B. The issue of proximate cause was 
sufficiently raised by Respondents at the trial court level. 
The facts of this case, as set forth in 
Dr. Nickol's Memorandum in Support of his Motion for 
Summary Judgment indicate that there was more than a four-month 
period of time between the time Tiffany Butterfield was 
seen by Dr. Nichol until her death on December 20, 1984. (R. 
at 147-48.) Further, the trial court had before it 
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uncontroverted medical records evidencing the fact that the 
Butterfields took Tiffany to see Dr. McClellan on at 
least five occasions prior to her death. 
The remoteness of time, coupled with the expert 
testimony of Dr. Michael C. Pinell regarding Dr. Nickol's 
compliance with the requisite standard of care, presented the 
trial court with the factual scenario that Tiffany7s death 
must have been caused by "intervening events that superseded 
misconduct [if any] on the part of Dr. Nickol." 
c. The Court of Appeals properly ruled on lack 
of proximate cause despite the fact that the lower Court's 
Order referred to intervening events that superseded any 
misconduct on the part of the respondents. 
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals stated that the 
allegations of causation was a critical element of the 
Butterfield's prima facie case and, "without proof of 
proximate cause, the plaintiffs cannot recover in tort". 
(Citations omitted). The Court found that petitioners failed 
to come forward with evidence of a causal link and found the 
Affidavit of Dr. Jacobs to be insufficient to establish such 
a link. 
On page two of Petitioners Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari petitioners argue that the Court improperly shifted 
the burden to petitioners to show a lack of intervening 
factors. That simply is not the case. The petitioners never 
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came forth with substantial evidence to even make out a prima 
facie case; therefore, the burden always remained with 
petitioners and respondents had no duty to rebut insufficient 
evidence. In Jackson v. Hicks. 738 P.2d 1037, 1039 (Utah 
1987) the Court states: 
When a plaintiff has failed to make out 
even a prima facie case concerning 
causation, it would be meaningless to 
require defendant to produce substantial 
evidence to rebut evidence which, as a 
matter of law, is insufficient to support 
the award. 
Id. at 1039. 
Since the petitioners never satisfied their initial 
burden of proof, the burden was never shifted from 
petitioners. The Court of Appeals properly upheld the lower 
court's decision to dismiss the petitioners case. 
CONCLUSION 
The Butterfields' Petition For Writ of Certiorari 
should be denied in this case for the following reasons. 
First, the Petition was filed after the May 28, 1990 deadline; 
Second, the Petition fails to comport with Rules 47 and 49 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure governing review of Writs 
of Certiorari. Particularly, Petitioners have failed to state 
specifically in regard to Rule 46 why the Court of Appeals 
exceeded or abused its jurisdiction. Finally, the Court of 
Appeals properly affirmed the District Court's Order of 
Dismissal on the basis that Petitioners failed to establish 
-16-
even a prima facie case that Respondent's conduct was a 
proximate cause of Tiffany Butterfield's death. 
For the above stated reasons, Respondent Dr. Nickol 
respectfully requests that Petitioners' Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari be denied. 
DATED this 2.^- day of ^J*JL^ , 19 % . 
RICHARDSy BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
GARY/p. STOTT 
JOANS' E. CARNAHAN 
Attorney for Respondent Nickol 
JOHN/B/JCW 
jb62690 
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ADDENDUM A 
R. Scott Williams, #'3498 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant Okubo 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
19 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
JAN 27 1939 
M. Owen Hup**, a** j,«j OJM C O * I 
By K fiv£/fr./} 
« 0*puv Or* 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
——oooOooo—— 
ALBERT JOHN AND ANGELA 
BUTTERFIELD, as guardians 
and parents of and on 
behalf of TIFFANY RUTH 
BUTTERFIELD, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
DAVID OKUBO, THOMAS NICKOL, 
and HOLY CROSS JORDAN VALLEY 
HOSPITAL, JOHN DOES 1-5, 
ORDER AND SUMMARY JUDGMENTS. 
Civil No. C86-9250 
Judge Richard Moffat 
Defendants. 
•oooOooo-
The defendants David Okubo, Thomas Nickol, and Holy 
Cross Jordan Valley Hospital's Motions for summary judgment 
having come up for hearing on December 23, 1987, and the 
court having heard additional arguments on January 5, 1988, 
and the court having reviewed the memoranda and affidavits 
in this matter, and the court having found as followsx 
1. Plaintiffs have not established through competent 
or qualified expert -testimony that defendants breached the 
requisite standard of care required of them in the treatment 
administered to the infant deceased plaintiff Tiffany Ruth 
Butterfield. 
2. The defendant Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital 
is not liable to plaintiffs as a matter of law inasmuch as 
the hospital employees involved in this case cannot practice 
medicine, and are not held to the standard required of the 
individual practicing physicians• 
3. In addition, the alleged misconduct on the part 
of all the respective defendants, David Okubo, Thomas Nickol 
and the Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital, were not a proximate 
cause of the infant plaintiff's death inasmuch as there were 
intervening events that superceded any misconduct on the 
part of said defendants. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that the motions for summary judgment of David Okubo, Thomas 
Nickol and Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital be and the same 
are hereby granted and defendants are awarded a judgment 
against plaintiffs, no cause of action, together with costs. 
DATED this Clf] day of (^Jps*u+**t£ ^^Tl^ZZ. 
Districjf CoM^/^ufSfeST 
HIN! 
CLERK 
_2_ . H. DIXON DLEY 
By-Ji Canity Cierx 
ADDENDUM B 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
FfLED 
Albert John Butterfield and 
Angela Butterfield, on behalf 
of Tiffany Ruth Butterfield, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
David Okubo, Thomas Nickol, 
and Holy Cross Jordan Valley 
Hospital, 
Defendant and Respondents. 
MAR £81990 
**pT* o1 lh#.Couft 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No- 880347-CA 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The* Honorable Richard H. Moffat 
Attorneys: David L. Grindstaff, Salt Lake City, for the 
Butterfields 
R. Scott Williams, Salt Lake City, for Okubo 
Gary D. Stott, Salt Lake City, for Nickol 
David W. Slagle, Salt Lake City, for Holy Cross Jordan 
Valley Hospital 
Before Judges Davidson, Jackson, and Larson.1 
LARSON, Judge: 
Albert and Angela Butterfield appeal from a summary judgment 
dismissing this action for wrongful death, which they allege to 
be due to medical malpractice by the defendants. Because of a 
lack of evidence in the record concerning proximate cause, we 
affirm. 
1. John Farr Larson, Senior Juvenile Judge, sitting by special 
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp. 1989). 
The Butterfields' infant daughter Tiffany died at home on 
December 20, 1984 of sudden infant death syndrome. She was 
born June 30, 1984. On that day and again on July 16, 1984, 
Tiffany was examined by Dr. David Okubo, a pediatrician. On 
two occasions in July and August 1984, the Butterfields noted 
apparent problems in Tiffany*s breathing and took her to the 
emergency room of Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital ("Holy 
Cross1*), where she was examined and treated by Dr. Thomas 
Nickol, an emergency room physician and general practitioner. 
Thereafter, the Butterfields placed Tiffany exclusively in the 
care and treatment of Dr. Monty McClellan, a family 
practitioner. He examined Tiffany on five occasions in August 
through mid-December, 1984. 
Following his August 16, 1984 examination, Dr. Nickol 
recommended close observation of Tiffany's breathing with 
attention to possible cyanosis or blue discoloration. However, 
neither Drs. Nickol or Okubo nor Holy Cross referred the 
Butterfields to a physician with more extensive expertise 
specifically in infant breathing disorders. They also did not 
recommend the use of home apnea monitoring equipment. The 
record does not indicate what, if any, care or treatment was 
provided by Dr. McClellan for Tiffany's breathing problems 
during the last four months of her life. 
After Tiffany's death, the Butterfields sued Drs. Nickol 
and Okubo and Holy Cross (but not Dr. McClellan) for medical 
malpractice, filing their complaint on December 15, 1986. On 
August 25, 1987, the district court held a scheduling 
conference, after which an order issued stating that "All 
discovery must be completed, including the filing of 
depositions[,] by December 11, 1987." On December 11, 1987, 
the Butterfields moved to extend the discovery deadline in 
relation to Holy Cross, and on December 23, 1987, in relation 
to Dr. Nickol. On December 10 and 11, 1987, the defendants 
filed motions for summary judgment accompanied by affidavits 
stating in essence that the defendants' treatment of Tiffany 
had not fallen below the applicable standard of care and was 
not the cause of her death. The court heard those motions on 
December 23, 1987. The Butterfields had no expert testimony in 
the record in their favor until the day before the summary 
judgment hearing, when they filed an affidavit by Dr. H. Barry 
Jacobs. They attempted service of the Jacobs affidavit on 
opposing counsel that evening and/or the next day. The copy 
intended for Dr. Nickol's counsel was left with a security 
guard employed at the office building at which counsel works, 
and Dr. Okubo's counsel could not locate any served copy until 
after the summary judgment hearing. 
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The trial court noted the apparent defects in service of 
the Jacobs affidavit/ and seems to have concluded that/ with or 
without the Jacobs affidavit/ the Butterfields had failed to 
establish a prima facie case because no competent expert 
testimony indicated either a breach of the standard of care or 
that the defendants' medical treatment proximately caused the 
child's death. The principal2 issues presented are therefore 
(1) whether the Jacobs affidavit is entitled to consideration 
in ruling on the motion/ and (2) whether there is sufficient 
evidence in the record to create a factual issue about whether 
the defendants both breached the standard of care applicable to 
each and thereby proximately caused Tiffany's death. 
Service of the Jacobs Affidavit 
As courts have often noted/ a party opposing a motion for 
summary judgment that is supported by affidavits and/or other 
evidentiary materials "may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
. . . otherwise . . . must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against him."3 In this case, therefore, the Butterfields had 
2. The Butterfields also argue that the district court should 
have granted their motion to extend the time limit for 
completion of discovery. However, we find no abuse of 
discretion in the trial court's scheduling of the case. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 16(b); 3 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 
1f 16.22 at 16-123 (2d ed.1989). Moreover, since the case was 
properly dismissed on summary judgment, additional time for 
discovery would serve no purpose. The Butterfields were not 
entitled to delay the summary judgment because they failed to 
proceed under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f). SS& Cox v. Winters, 678 
P.2d 311, 314 (Utah 1984); Reeves v. Geiov Pharmaceutical, 
Inc,/ 764 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Downtown Athletic 
Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275, 278-79 (Utah Ct. 1987). 
3. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Co.. 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987); Franklin Fin, v. New 
Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983). 
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to introduce evidence supporting those elements4 of their 
case that had been effectively challenged by the defendants in 
moving for summary judgment. A major part of the Butterfields1 
evidence was the Jacobs affidavit. 
The defendants argue that the Jacobs affidavit should not 
be considered because it was not properly served on their 
counsel. Axiomatically, an affidavit in opposition to a motion 
for summary judgment must not merely be filed with the court; 
it must also be served on opposing counsel no later than the 
day before the hearing on the motion#5 to allow them an 
opportunity to prepare for the hearing. We have previously 
noted that an affidavit that has not been properly served 
should not be considered, and the motion may be resolved 
without it. P & B Land, Inc. v. Klunoervik, 751 P.2d 274, 277 
(Utah App. 1988). 
In this case, however, the facts relating to the lack of 
service were not suitably established. The Jacobs affidavit 
was accompanied by a certificate attesting to proper service. 
The only evidence to the contrary in the record is the unsworn 
verbal representations of counsel about the defects in service, 
representations based in part on hearsay conversations with 
their office personnel. While we have no reason to question 
the accuracy of counsel§s representations, the Jacobs affidavit 
was nevertheless the principal feature of the Butterfields1 
opposition to the potentially dispositive motions for summary 
judgment. The certificate of service is entitled to be taken 
at face value, unless admissible evidence shows it to be 
erroneous. The representations of counsel, though entirely 
credible as far as they go, are nevertheless not evidence, and 
therefore do not suffice to establish facts showing fatal 
deficiencies in the service of the Jacobs affidavit. We 
therefore consider the Jacobs affidavit in determining whether 
the Butterfields came forward with sufficient evidence to 
warrant denial of summary judgment. 
4. Briefly, to recover for medical malpractice, the plaintiff 
must show that he or she suffered an injury that was actually 
and proximately caused by an act or omission of the medical 
professional that fell below the standard of care for that 
professional's medical field or specialty. See Robinson v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. 740 P.2d 262 (Utah App. 1987); 
Hoopiiana v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc. 740 P.2d 270 (Utah 
App. 1987). 
5. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
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Standard of Care 
Due to the technical and complex nature of a medical 
doctor's services, expert medical testimony must ordinarily6 
be presented in order to establish the standard of care by 
which the doctor's conduct is to be measured and that the 
injury was proximately caused by conduct of the doctor that 
fell below that standard of care. Anderson v. Nixon. 104 Utah 
262, 139 P.2d 216, 220 (1943); Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 
817, 821-22 (Utah App. 1988); Martin v. Mott, 744 P.2d 337, 338 
(Utah App. 1987); Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc. 
740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah App, 1987). Further, the expert 
testimony, like the standard of care which is its subject 
matter, is specific to the particular medical specialty or area 
of expertise of the defendant. In other words, one physician 
is not qualified to give an admissible opinion on the treatment 
provided by another physician, unless the physician giving the 
opinion is shown to have familiarity with the treating 
physician's particular area of practice.7 
The expert affidavits submitted by the defendants in 
moving for summary judgment indicate both that the attesting 
expert was qualified to render an opinion on the standard of 
care applicable to the particular defendant about which he was 
speaking, and that the defendant's treatment of Tiffany did not 
fall below that standard. The question thus becomes whether 
Dr. Jacobs also indicated familiarity with the standards of 
6. An exception is made where the physician's error is so 
plain and simple that it is within the range of ordinary lay 
knowledge. For example, in Nixdorf v. Hicken. 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 
1980), a surgeon left a surgical cutting needle inside the 
plaintiff's body, and the court held that expert testimony on 
the standard of care was not needed, in essence because 
everybody knows that a surgeon should not leave inside a sharp, 
foreign object used to make the incision. In this case, 
however, whether the defendants should have taken additional 
steps to prevent future apnea is a factual question not within 
the range of ordinary lay knowledge. 
7. Burton v. Younablood. 711 P.2d 245, 247-48 (Utah 1985); see 
also Chadwick, 763 P.2d at 822. 
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care applicable to the defendants sufficient to warrant 
consideration of his opinion. In that regard, Dr. Jacobs 
stated: 
1. I am a physician licensed in the State 
of Maryland and am a Board Certified Surgeon 
since 1974. I have past experience in 
Emergency Room care at four hospitals, and 
Pediatrics, having cared for patients in 
private practice and hospitals, including 
the Children's Hospital in Washington, D.C. 
• • • • 
3. I am familiar with the Standard of Care, 
applicable in 1984, required in pediatrics 
and emergency room medicine, as well as 
hospital responsibility for adequate record 
keeping and availability of previous records 
during later follow up care for a related 
complaint. 
Based on those statements, there is reason to question whether 
Dr. Jacobs' apparently rather eclectic background qualifies him 
as an expert in all three of the defendants9 fields of medical 
practice. However, our role is not to cross-examine the 
affidavit by conjecture;8 rather, we take it at face value, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Butterfields, since they lost the summary judgment motions in 
the court below.9 In that light, Dr. Jacobs' representations 
of his competence are not so patently unfounded or conclusory 
that they can be wholly disregarded. Because Dr. Jacobs' 
opinion concerning the standard of care contradicts those of 
the defendants' experts, it demonstrates the existence of a 
dispute of material fact, which precludes summary judgment on 
the question of the standard of care. 
Proximate Causation 
However, while Dr. Jacobs' criticizes the defendants' 
treatment of Tiffany, he does not establish the requisite 
8. SS£ Reeves, 764 P.2d at 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("In 
considering a motion for summary judgment, it is not appropriate 
for a court to weigh the evidence or assess credibilityt.])M 
9
- Branham v. Provo School Dist., 780 P.2d 810 (Utah 1989); 
Blue cr™*9 & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank. 737 P.2d 225, 299 (Utah 
1987). 
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causal link between that treatment and Tiffany*s death. Dr. 
Jacobs opines that the defendants' failure to prescribe home 
monitoring of Tiffany's breathing, and perhaps also a more 
generalized inattention to Tiffany's breathing problems, 
constitute treatment falling below the standard of care. 
However, those asserted errors occurred in mid-1984, whereas 
Tiffany died on December 19, 1984, four months after she had 
been placed in the care of another medical practitioner. The 
defendants argue that these facts, along with expert opinion, 
indicate that their treatment of Tiffany did not proximately 
cause her death. Dr. Jacobs, however, ignores the causation 
question. 
The element of proximate causation in a tort case inquires 
into whether the defendant could, under the circumstances, 
reasonably have foreseen that the harm of which the plaintiff 
complains would result from the defendant's breach of the 
standard of care. See Jackson v. Hicks, 738 P.2d 1037, 1039 
(Utah 1987); Mitchell v. Pearson Enters,, Inc.. 697 P.2d 240, 
245-47 (Utah 1985); Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723, 728-29 
(Utah 1985). Without proof of proximate cause, the plaintiff 
cannot recover in tort. Powell pjy, Q£ PQW Chemical U»S>At Y» 
Del-Rio Drilling Programs. Inc.. 761 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 
1988); Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 
1082-83 (Utah 1985). 
When proximate causation was called into question by the 
defendants in moving for summary judgment, it was incumbent on 
the Butterfields to come forward with evidence of a causal link 
between the purported malpractice and the harm for which they 
seek damages.10 However, there is nothing in the Jacobs 
affidavit to indicate that the defendants* medical treatment 
proximately caused Tiffany*s death, or even caused her death at 
all. From the record, we cannot exclude the possibility that 
the defendants may have erred, but fortuitously, their error 
was not a cause, or a substantial enough cause, of Tiffany*s 
death.11 The allegation of causation, a critical element of 
the Butterfields' prima facie case, thus remains 
unsubstantiated. 
10- flynt Vt Hyrst, 125 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 24 (1990). 
11. Cf. Reeves. 764 P.2d at 642 (Utah App. 1988). 
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Conclusion 
We conclude that the Jacobs affidavit was before the 
court, absent evidence indicating that it was not properly 
served. That affidavit, though conclusory, nevertheless 
introduces enough apparently competent expert testimony to 
create a factual dispute on the question whether the 
defendants' treatment of Tiffany Butterfield fell below the 
applicable standards of care. However, even viewing the facts 
in the light most favorable to the Butterfields, there is a 
dearth of evidence in the record to counter the defendants1 
assertions that their treatment of Tiffany did not proximately 
cause her death. 
We therefore affirm the district court's order of 
dismissal. 
slA^ C~Jd^<-^*^ 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Norman H. Jacksonv^ 3Tudge 
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ADDENDUM C 
David L. Grindstaff, #4043 
395 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, 0T 84102 
(801) 363-1370 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERT JOHN BUTTERFIELD, 
and ANGELA BUTTERFIELD, on 
behalf of TIFFANY RUTH 
BUTTERFIELD, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
DAVID 0KUB0, THOMAS NICKOL, 
and HOLY CROSS JORDAN VALLEY 
HOSPITAL, 
Respondents. 
ORDER 
Based upon Petitioner's motion and for good cause 
appearing therefrom, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioners motion 
for an enlargment of time to file a Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari in the above-entitled case is granted and Petitioners 
shall have till May 28, 1990 to file a Petition in the above-
entitled case. 
BY THE COURT: J^J^J^J* f 
Supreme Court Judge 
ORDER FOR ENLARGEMENT OF 
TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Case No. 880347-CA 
ADDENDUM D 
$ Uy ^ !°f& 
V ORIGINAL 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
ALBERT JOHN and ANGELA 
BUTTERFIELD, as guardian and 
parents of and on behalf of 
TIFFANY RUTH BUTTERFIELD, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
DAVID OKUBO, THOMAS NICKOL, 
and HOLY CROSS JORDAN VALLEY 
HOSPITAL, JOHN DOES 1-5, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Petition for writ of certiorari from an denial 
of an appeal by the Utah Court of Appeals 
David Grindstaff l'D'0 
395 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 363-1370 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants 
R. Scott Williams 
STRONG & HANNI 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent Okubo 
David W. Slagle 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for Holy Cross 
Gary D. Sstott 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
50 South Main Street, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Respondent Nickol 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI 
- ———
m 
CA 880347-CA 
DC C86-9250 
Category No. 13 
FILED 
MAY 2 y tvyu 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Ut*h 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
ALBERT JOHN and ANGELA 
BUTTERFIELD, as guardian and 
parents of and on behalf of 
TIFFANY RUTH BUTTERFIELD, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
DAVID OKUBO, THOMAS NICKOL, 
and HOLY CROSS JORDAN VALLEY 
HOSPITAL, JOHN DOES 1-5, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did Plaintiff establish the requisite causal link between 
the treatment rendered by Defendants' to the death of the minor 
child? 
Was proximate causation called into question by the 
defendants in moving for summary judgment sufficiently to require 
Plaintiffs to come forward with evidence of a causal link between 
the purported malpractice and harm for which Plaintiffs sought 
damages? 
Did the Court improperly rule on lack of proximate cause 
when the lower court ruled on the issue of proximate causation 
only from the perspective that intervening events occurred 
superceding any misconduct on the part of the defendants? 
Reference to Opinion Below 
Butterfield v. Okubo, 880347CA, filed March 28, 1990. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI 
CA 880347-CA 
DC C86-9250 
1 
Jurisdiction 
The jurisdiction of the S.upreme Court is invoked pursuant to 
Utah Code Annot. 78-2-2(5) requesting review of a Utah Court of 
Appeals decision filed on March 28, 1990 This court has granted 
an extension of time on April 27, 1990 for Petitioners to file a 
petition by May 27, 1990. 
Controlling Provisions 
Jackson v. Hicks, 738 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1987), Mitchell v. 
Pearson Enters., Inc., 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985), Williams v. 
Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985), Restatements 2d of Torts 
sections 431-452, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 8, and 
Powell Div. of Dow Chemical U. S. A. v. Del-Rio Drilling 
Programs, Inc., 761 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1988). 
Statement of the Case 
Petitioners filed a wrongful death complaint against 
respondents Dr. Nickol, Dr. Okubo, and Holy Cross Jordan Valley 
Hospital alleging improper and negligent treatment by respondents 
resulted in their infant child's death. 
The respondents moved for summary judgment at the District 
Court level and were granted summary judgment by an order dated 
January 27, 1988. See addendum "A." Petitioners appealed the 
order granting summary judgment and the Court of Appeals affirmed 
the lower court judgment. See addendum "B." 
Petitioners presented an affidavit of Dr. Jacobs to defeat 
their summary judgment motions. See addendum "C." 
Arguments 
POINT I 
2 
4 . \ , i ESTABLISHED P v nETTTTONTT:^ 
' *\* Cour t of A p p e a l s i ound t h a t P e t i t i : > n ^ r d i o not e ^ * a b i i ? h 
. : ' . . :< i.:iii. .J* f dppeiiUt, ' ' 2 p a g e s t .-. r, 
H O W P V H : - l o s e I O O K a t t r i < J S U t; t ^* * 1 ,- a a f f l o a v 1 - I ^  - r ! < * 
i n d i c a t e - • . < 
p r e s e n t s ^ * . -n • .: i . c a t . ^ 4r. :* R e s p o n d e n t s i a i , •- t.< 
f o l l o w t r i e * a n d a r d ^f ( ^ r ^ rpQij i jpH ^ • h» - ^v.h - f * ^  r a r * : e s 
n . • - . : . , . . . . ° v 
a n c icc t rp ted ^Lcinaa id 1 neg 1 iqenr*>) jn . : WM , t ,«- p r o x i m a t e c a u s ^ >: 
t h e c h i l d ' s d e m i s e from STOP ^ ) P ^ | :" * > 
pr . . : . . . . - _ . . L . p -
 t / 
r e c o r d s a v a i l a b l e t o ;: - ta 1 , p i - I O U S h o s p i t i l v i s i t s and r.« iv, * *• 
t w o r e s p o n d e n t p h y r u c i i n r r u ^ " * •- . . f 
h • ^ * . wi-. «...,. 4- q u i Leo t h e ...-
a p n e a r -ni t s T h e r e f o r e t h e p r o p e r l e g a l c a u s e r*- *'~-e d e m i s e > f 
• h * ; • t a ^ * - « p r e s e n t e d w h e n 1 ooke< I s .1 i 1 :i, I .1 1 = Il :i 3 i 1 1 1 1 r : = I 
* - : n e r . 
POINT I I 
THE COURT IMPROPERLY SHI P« n "I! ) 1 "  IF BURE EI I T> : I ETITI : I JEF T Z SI IC I I 
A O S / L K V E N I M G FACTORS 
The co<,: ' ,\ granting summary -)uriamr>.4 « o« respondent- r-ilf-d 
1: . . ^  . ..aoiiiuci! _ • i-if **r- ;i f.t iveru! J t-w-i.tj- * .-' 
: j p e r c e d e d -o . •. <-r:ndui- - - : t h e s a i : d e i e n d a - 4 -
A p •* summary . ^ g rnen 4 - ^ 
s p e c i i ^ any * , ic*ud L e l e m e n t s ol • : t e i v e m i i j e v e n t s an 1 *:.*_!•_-
i s n o t h i n g ^~ 4~u~ ^ c o r d ^o q i v ^ P l a i n 4 - i : := c a u s e *~^  r D b u f a^v 
asr^rtion of superredu-m ^HUSPS fT ^ r p f r . r p , 4 , n « ^ r p q u n e d ,i- : 
r u ^ . d n n i :. t. - : 
r e b u t t a l i m p e r m i s 1 v e l y s h i t t e d • h.- t u j j n o t p ro« 1 r , J e r i i O J 
P ] .1 i r + • • i ( J . r : r r - - „ 
Dated t h i s <.o-.h ^ ; , i ;• -- . 1990'. 
David G r i n d s t a f f 
A11 o r n e y f o r P e t i t i o n e r 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
* ereby certify that lour t; *<* - n- correct copies 
. Scot: A i ' i ; an -
STRONG & HANNI 
Si xth Floor Bosion euii'jui'j 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent Okubo 
David W. Slagle 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
] 0 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for Holy Cross 
Gar}- C , Sstot .t 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
50 South Main Street, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
A11orneys for Respondent Ni cko1 
4 
ADDKNDIIM K 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Q 
A 
r* nnv r» record? 
Q I i e v i t w u I i 1 |, i i o r • n coming 
t o this deposi t i on? 
A , 
Q a o you can testify a a L v wt. 
t 1 «w ft. 6 V- V> JL VJ • 
** r» m •- k « »• <r> « /% •• | j
 # DO 
• d c p e n 
. w >.. %- x w M \j L L u « 
i u s t v i 
,n m f r n iiiii I Ii i i» i o r d • 
r e c o l l e c t ! o n > I L l i a L v u , : 
ft, I IIII n o t - c *• u -
w * <•» *- 11 ^ U U L t t l j • 
I v n n h o a h l o # - « » • « 
Butterlluld paienLs --
A No. 
Q - John and A m i e l a / I i I Il • , 
vi in j t- yon remember after "evipwinq the 'ecord of 
M h a f o r c mi i i P i l HI III I HI II y i| n h i i« i | i | || |
 M i| | \\ » 
B u t I e i t i e 1 1,1 c h i 1 d 
A I i e m e ai u e T P 
1 
2 
3 
r e c J 
~ u ; i A u 
J. A 
JL a 
£ i. 
? 5 
z j 
24 
./ i. \ » V / » l V j ' W * « r w — *. 
e v a I u a t i n «i i. 11 <• < 11 J i u* i a p p e a r e d fhat" T i c I M 
w a s a w a k ' I 1 d » o L f i n d a n y 
h y s i o a ; f i n d i n Q 3 w i t l , 'i i 1 d !, h = *: w e r e a 
i o n c e r n T r o a MI I IJI II I • 11 i 11 n ' I f h 1| t A i e 1 t 
L i i e c I'm i I i\ a p in e a r e d t o h n i| i 11 * i n >'j n o r m a l 1 y A s 
T r e c c i 1 i u L I , n i ' i i ' •» j t h e i e c o i d » 
I I • I i t' 11 H1 n \ 1i1 w a s «; v i e • i » o u n d s , •» » ^ *• h e 
in i [ i ,, i , | ' < e n a l i d d h a l f 
I n II n d i . S o t h a i I h v l ' I ' .«.I i i u r p a s s e ^ b i r t h 
. e i ^ Ii. I I I " ' ' L o
 s e V e n 
J « » a s s o i e d t h P 
«l 1 1 I M 
i mi 
II mi mi 
II f I i III I ? | III I I 111 U \ <? 
II III III III I III III III II II III P I II I III' I I • 
j 1 1 " 1 -
1 U U 
i i h i i e « 
U 1" 
M
 h a f j A , f r ^ 
d o i i L i P ro e PI l"» * r s e e i i1,1 .*) • h e • h i 1 d • 
"in mi ,,1 ( l| ill . 
U K . M m I I  Il > i n d i c a t e d i n y o u h P 
h a s n o r e r o l I i i il i 1111 i l i il il 1 i i il il i i il mi il i < i s e 
v i s i t s , n a v P il il il  il i i 
mi I mi I III II II i III III in i mi 11 mi III mi III III III II III mi in 
n i i . i l ' O T T I 111 II I ! 11111 i e a cl 1 n y l i > y 
w h a t ** f\ T> 
Q L e t 
i * . . ^ s u o . . - . . . . w e l l R o p o t t i n < ! 
a 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
i i m Improver! w I L In f". net ionin q o If t hi e nose t i i • :::1 
in II II in III i i I I I mi I I I mi I I I IIII I I i I i I I ' ' I 
!, h i • * > -1 » H v (i r • » s i g n i f i c a n t 
I mi 1 
i s s e s j m n i i w n u I \i i n 1 i n d i c a t e d o y n o i inn a i « ili i 1 
i mi II II mi i II i mi II I I 
Q I'll1 I  II II I rl o e s t h i s 
iii in I  in 1 mi i mi mi in mi mi mi in II II II IIII i1 I l l 
i o j i 'i i, h a t m e a n • i y o u ? 
r I I II ill II 1 II In i Ill II 
r e c n l 1 e * f i o 11 11 m i "i <1 i 11 I < i > < I t y i i • d i 1 1 e i e n c e s 
II i II I I I mi i i IIII i IIII i II i n i IIII II II i 
w e i* i? n o n e , t n In I s i e c o l 1 e c t i o n 
Q D o > o u i e c a 1 1 s p e a k i i i g t c D r » 01 : u I: 
mi A g a i i i , i in :: i i i d e p e n d e n t r e c o 1 1 e c t: i o n , 
II ill mi ill 1 Il I II i l l Ill II Il 1 II II I  II I 
W O U J 'J h J V f I "  " > l l h ' ' I I I I I", j P ' 
I IIII 11 I I IIII III II III I I 11 III I II III ((I 11 ill | 111 (I I III III III | 111 I I I 1 111 I 111 III 1 1 I 1 1 1 
iii , i III in in in >5 p o k e w i I IIII ii i in , I.I i i JI u u e 1 j u s t n a v u 
III mi in II ii Ill I,, in IIII ill In IIII i > IIII i ill . 
nil1 III . u p 1 "l  i , 11 i I i I iii h e i e III i ". ,„ i |i» «i ' Il ' 
iiP IIII 1 IIII III i | " I mi IIII 1 in i i "in < in i i i IIII f« Il I i Il I in 
b e I o w n l i d o e s t h a t say? 
I I , I I , I *i A . m . n f 
s o o n e i I HI r d i mi j in n c i e a s e d s y m p t o in u .
 n » . u i. u c u 
II e s t o i i ii 1 1 o w e l l R e p o i 1 1 n g 
t \ . & i i V J U M I I a \. I . l i e U u l L O t n . A l t 
^ U * 11 n ^ •» /> I* t* W *% J — — 
i a t i e u s oms . 
i 0 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q Pn y i MI r e c a l l 1 ., o K i n q . i t t h i :•» 
- II l i e '• i n i i i «• i i y i M I w ii ci i | * ii i i II i • 
d h a v e s e e n o n t h i s o c c a s i o n ? 
A In l o o k i n g a t my r e c o r 
i " H i c a t P , i g a i. n , w h e t h e r I :i a w < « n i ic 
L il L I I l. L . I l l 1 U U H I 11 j ii I I 11 I 11 11 I • I i I I I I M l I 
w o u l d a p p e a r i t w o 11 1 u n it v c n e e n MM? in 111 h e r . 
0 < Ms . i y . ihi you Ii .i v i> .i • u h s i"| " c n I 
r n p n r t , August Mi t. I i , ' II 1 - ? 
A Y i " . . 
U e n t i t l e d " E m e r g e n c y Rooin" d e a I i 
w i t h T i I I .niv Mil I I c i I i <« I il i' 
A Y e s . 
I I | I I I I I I I I 11 | I 11 II I | H 11 II I I I I 
r n r o l l e c t i o n n I I h l s I I I , u I Ii i L I. II a n w h a t 
W II L 
— — _ i- t y o u i: • :: i i 1 i a , i i d w i: ii t i n g . 
• = -1 1 : f "I • I :! 1 1 y s I : I a n i o t e s 
w e t; e m * h a n cl w r i 1 1 n g # c o n d i t i o in o i i d i s c h a r g e . 
I I1"  1 i E • i i j • : u r B c e I J e a p a t i e n t - -
l1'" fl !- ft n L , U" u j 111 i 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
13 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A The time might be mine. I don't 
know. 
Q Apparently -- would this not be true 
that it says that there were problems 
breathing? 
A It indicates that the mother was 
concerned about an irregular breathing pattern. 
She indicated that she felt there were 
approximately four second periods where the 
child did not breathe, although the child did 
not become cyanotic, which is what blue 
discoloration is, and that the child was 
eating, voiding and stooling normally and that 
mother, again, was concerned about nasal 
congestion. The period, again, of four seconds 
without breathing, or an irregular breathing 
pattern, in a new born is not necessarily 
abno rmal. 
Q Okay. Would you read the part after 
the nasal congestion and read to me what 
that -- would you read all your notes and tell 
me what that would mean about the condition of 
the person that you might have seen? 
A The "0" stands for objective, which 
is the physical examination. The general exam 
28 Heston & Howell Reporting 
1 revealed awake and alert normal, active for 
2 age. "H•E.E.N.T." stands for head, ears eyes, 
3 nose and throat. "P.E.R.R.L.A." stands for 
4 pupils equal, round, and reactive to light and 
5 accommodation. "E.O.M.I. - is external ocular 
6 muscles intact. Fontanel, soft. Mucous 
7 membranes moist. Slight nasal congestion. 
8 Neck supple. Lungs clear. No wheezes, rhonchi 
9 or stridor. Abdomen, bowel sounds present. 
10 Extremities, good color. (Pink). Neurologic 
11 exam appropriate for age. Assessment, normal 
12 well child check. Plan, monitor for increased 
13 respiratory distress with cyanosis (blue 
14 discoloration). Humidifier, bulb suction, 
15 continued formula feeding. Follow up with 
16 Okubo for two month check and immunization, 
17 sooner for problems. Condition at discharge, 
18 good. Time of discharge 0040. 
19 Q Okay. Would you typically ask for a 
20 history from the mother --
21 A Yes. 
2 2
 Q -- of prior problems? From this 
23 report can you tell me whether or not you asked 
24 whether there had been prior problems? 
25 A From the records here it, again, 
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A My understanding of SIOS is that it 
is an idiopathic disorder affecting primarily 
males in the first year of life with the peak 
incidence between two and four months; that it 
has a seasonal predilection between October and 
March; that, again, there are certain risk 
factors, that it is the most common cause of 
infant death, has the incidence of about two 
per thousand live births. And that, again, 
there is no -- at least at this time, no known 
cause for the SIDS. It doesn't seem to be 
contagious, doesn't seem to be related to an 
infectious problem, pneumonia, that type of 
thing. 
Q Had you been exposed to actual SIDS 
patients prior to '84, July of '84? 
A Yes. 
Q How many patients? 
A I don•t k now. 
Q Had you ever referred a patient to 
another specialist for possible SIDS 
evaluat ion? 
A Not the emergency room. Again, in 
working the emergency room the primary job that 
I have as an emergency room specialist is to 
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attempt to determine whether a patient needs to 
be admitted to the hospital. The majority of 
patients will have their own private physician. 
And the evaluation of SIDS, or a predilection 
for SIDS, usually is going to be started by the 
private physician if there is a concern. On 
the emergency room physician's shoulders lies 
the responsibility of whether a patient, again, 
needs to be admitted to the hospital for 
observation or care of the individual patient. 
So the actual referral for a SIDS evaluation 
most times is going to be done through the 
private physician's office if there is a 
concern, or if there is a concern on the 
emergency room physician's part, again, an 
admission will occur and then further workup if 
deemed necessary by the private physician, not 
the emergency room doctor. 
Q Okay. As I understand, you are 
saying your role was different than the role of 
a family physician as an emergency room 
physician. 
A Defini tely. 
Q And what you described to me as what 
your role as an emergency room physician would 
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be -- where would you learn what your role 
would be as an emergency room physician? 
A Again, during the training that I had 
in family practice part of that training is 
spent during rotations in emergency rooms 
working with established emergency 
practicioners and being trained and supervised 
by them prior to, again, being independent. 
Q Would an emergency room physician 
refer someone who had heart problems, for 
example, to the family practitioner, or 
would --
A Potentially. 
Q Would it be common for you to refer 
someone with heart problems to a cardiologist? 
A Not if they had their own physician. 
Q If they had their own physician. 
What about if someone had a skin disorder, 
would you refer them to their family 
practit ioner? 
A If they had their own physician you 
are going to contact the patient's own 
physician before you are going to make a 
referral to a subspecialist. Again, as a 
matter of courtesy if nothing else. But the 
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standard at least is to talk to the private 
physician because they have a better working 
relationship in the dealings with the patient. 
They have been taking care of them more than 
once or twice, which is the usual situation in 
the emergency room. 
Q Would that be true even if there is 
an emergency situation, that before you would 
bring in a cardiologist or a heart expert, you 
would always contact the individual's personal 
family physician? 
A Well, the words "always" are a little 
bit difficult to substantiate, but given the 
absence of extenuating circumstances, 
contacting the private physician is the usual 
protocol and standard, that's correct. 
Q What would be extenuating 
circumstances such that you normally wouldn't 
go through the family physician? 
A Oh, for instance if a person had a 
private family physician but came in with a 
situation needing emergent thoracotomy or 
surgery, you might have to call the surgeon to 
be involved with a life saving maneuver and 
then call the private practitioner. In other 
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ADDENDUM F 
26 
time we got to the hospital, and I explained to the doctor, 
Dr. Nickol, that she had went blue and that we had to 
stimulate her to catch her breath all the way from our home to 
the hospital. And he checked her out and sort of laughed at 
it and said that there was nothing wrong with her, she's 
developing a breathing pattern and that she'd be fine. And he 
called Dr. Okubo at that time and talked to him, and I don't 
know what was said. And he just told me to call Dr. Okubo 
tomorrow and discuss it with him and I did. 
Q What do you mean, he kind of laughed? 
A They laughed. 
Q Who is "they"? 
A Dr. Nickol and the nurse. You know, they really 
thought it was funny, but I was scared and so was my husband. 
She had quit breathing and they laughed it off like it was no 
big deal, she's establishing a breathing pattern, you're 
bothering me. That's how they made us feel, like we were 
freaking out on our baby, but we weren't. 
Q Did they tell you what they meant by "a breathing 
pattern"? 
A They said that babies have to develop a breathing 
pattern, anybody does. As they get older, they develop 
different breathing patterns, and babies, they develop a 
breathing pattern very slowly. Sometimes they breathe fast, 
sometimes they breathe slow, and he said. Don't worry, she's 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
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A Yes. 
Q And you d idn ' t see a doctor in the meantime; i s that 
correct? 
A After the 16th? 
Q No, between the 5th of July and the 16th of July, 
you didn't go see another doctor, did you? 
A No* 
Q When was the next breathing problem or the next 
incident with Tiffany, whatever it may have been? 
A August 16. 
Q Where? 
A At home. 
Q What time of day? 
A It was at night. I don't recall the time exactly. 
It was after 8:00. 
Q After 8:00 and before midnight? 
A Yes. 
Q What happened? 
A Me and John were both home and we both seen her go 
limp and lose her breath. 
Q Where was she? 
A On the couch. 
Q What were you folks doing? 
A Watching TV and, you know, talking with my other 
daughter. She was in kindergarten at that time, and we were 
41 
1 talking with her. And we just took her to the hospital again. 
2 Q Mrs. Butterfield, I know that it may be difficult to 
3 go through this, but we need to know the details of what 
4 happened that evening, what you saw her doing, what you folks 
5 did with her. 
6 A She wasn't breathing, that's what we saw. That 
7 night I carried her in the car, and I stimulated her all the 
8 way to the hospital. I didn't pinch her, I had to pat her 
9 back or I would move her up and down like this (indicating) to 
10 get her to catch her breath* Yes, she was not breathing at 
11 that time at all. 
12 Q In the home, what first called your attention to 
13 her? 
14 A My kids, I pay attention to all the time. And even 
15 with Melissa when she was a baby, I used to check her to see 
16 if she was breathing, because at the time it wasn't called 
17 SIDS, it was called crib death, and I just had — she was 
18 sitting right next to me, and I used to keep my hand on top of 
19 J her like this. 
20 Q This is Melissa? 
21 A No, this is Tiffany. And to feel them breathe, and 
22 I did that with Melissa when she was a baby, too. And she 
23 quit breathing. 
24 Q And you felt her quit breathing? 
25 A Yes, I did. 
46 
A We took her in there, she was checked again by Dr. 
Nickol, and he said the same thing, she's developing a 
breathing pattern, don't worry about it, and really made me 
feel foolish, 
Q Did you recognize him that time as having seen her 
before? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you tell him what had happened that evening? 
A Yes. 
Q And his response to you was what? 
A She's establishing a breathing pattern, everything 
else seems to be fine. 
Q Did you disagree with him? 
A I ~ no, I didn't. 
Q Did you tell him you didn't believe that's what she 
was doing? 
A No, I didn't. 
Q What did he do in terms of checking her? 
A The same as before. 
Q What? 
A Checked her eyes, checked her reflexes, checked her 
breathing, pushed on her belly, checked her private areas. 
Q What was her breathing like there in the hospital? 
A I wasn't a doctor. I didn't take and see what she 
was breathing, but she was breathing. 
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e i g h t e e n 
the xsgfri 
I understand t h a t you A 4 j arm ffiii fi^nrM)|ft^t^|§^1^lrf 1 
r e f e r r i n g t o your o f f i c e r e c o r d s now, I assume. 
Yes , I am. 
Could you t e l l me when you f i r s t saw her? 
When you saw h e r , d id her mother g i v e you any 
h i s t o r y ? 
Normally you always take a h i s t o r y . 
Can you t e l l me, t h e n , what h i s t o r y you were 
w i th a t t h a t t ime? 
That" qhp was ^^ji^uia^^^i^ii'h cpvpn nnnnd^ . 
and a h a l f - i n c h baby, t h a t had aoatiititfiPlaftjufcps* 
J w < | g 3 B 3 g a g i | i B g t ^ ^ ^ ffiLSHBl Ull * 
^ nfiJjjB.TriiiMMiii^  a r m m ^ ^ — w — • y w i w h • • # lihwfc' 
WipP^XXJJCLvAs w v 5. 
a Did she mention a t t h i s t ime «iM|aMlja^o |rM££$&lem4 
w i th breath ing? 
A. 
a 
the rash 
A. 
a 
N o ^ 
Did she mention a n ^ m n ^ ^ r . 1 fcr rtli H • • • i * * * 
t? 
* * * 
Did you then s c h e d u l e j u s t a r o u t i n e f o l l o w 
up or d id she c a l l the next t ime she was t o v i s i t you? 
A. I would have normal ly s chedu led a f o l l o w up. 
7. 
1 I don't recall whether I asked her to return specifically 
2 or whether that was her own idea, but I normally would 
3 have asked her to come back and then to start her 
4 immunization schedule. 
5 Q. Did she report on this first visit any complaint 
6 of listlessness? 
7 A. No. 
8 1 Q, In Tiffany? 
9 A. No. 
10 Q. Or congestion? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. What were your impressions, if you can remember? 
13 A. Just that she was a healthy baby and she had 
14 oral thrush. 
15 Q. When you saw her the 4tf^te£ime / can you tell 
16 us the date and what your findings were. 
17 A. I^wa^^^^^^A. Basically it was t^i^fpBH* 
19 ears, nose, eyes and throat were within normal limits. 
20 Fontanel was normal, the tear ducts were open, the yeast 
21 infection, intraorally was recovering with the microstatin 
22 I had given her. Her chest was clear, normal sinus rhythm, 
23 No abdominal masses, umbilicus was healed. No hernia, 
24 J no hip click. Feet were normal. DPT and oral polio 
were given that day and she was schedj^ej^for return 25 
Q. At this time w« 
yo*. wexa^ti 
Q. Was it your understanding that she was seeing 
you exclusively or did you know whether she was seeing 
other physicians, or did you know either way? 
A. I don't recall, honestly, 
Q. Do you recall on this second office visit having 
aoj^discussions regarding aPn^,^gff^Ilg^^ior^ 
k She didn't relate that the child was having 
any difficulties like that, 
Q. I won't go into the specific office visits. 
I also have a copy of your records but I did want to 
ask you a couple of questions about it. 
Were you also seeing the mother at this time 
as a patient? 
A. Yes, I believe I was. 
& Do you recall seeing her in r.he emergency room 
during the same period of time? 
A. It would have been about the same period of 
time but I don't have my records in front of me. I can't 
tell you exactly which date. 
Q. You don't have the records for the mother? 
A. Well, that wasn't what we were supposed to 
9. 
1 talk about today. I thought it was just about Tiffany 
2 and so— 
3 Q. Those are the only records you have? 
4 A. I could get them but, I havenft reviewed them 
5 op anything like that so— 
6 I Q. We will stick with Tiffany just to stay sequential} 
7 then, and then we could talk about the mother more later, 
8 J k Okay. 
9 Q. So your unde r s t and ing , t hen , you saw the c h i l d 
10 six times; is that correct? 
11 A. A c t u a l l y T hftlj»flirn lm ITIT' iihn nhii1i~ 
12 Q. F ive . Excuse me. 
13 A. J^itfiwifciiiiini^T -
14 Q. Because the December 22nd visit was just with 
15 the mother? 
16 A. Yes, it was. 
17
 ft ^ S S f c ^ S ^ 
18 Qflr-niriirrgr^Atf^ 
19 p ^ u i t ^ ^ ^ Iti . r f ^ * * * * ^ ^ 
21 A. Yes, on one occasion. I'm sorry. Two occasions. 
22 She told me on KT^Ty^mK^r ^ b^^^fe1[|a^Mthaj rAv^ y ^ w^ »^^  
23 having somsLJjmpi^ 
24 I ^thQugk,t~sk&« ha^r a^sexou*- o t i t i s , , media and 
25 when I saw her back on the^3£th that had resolved* 
10 
1 **^i*-s*e~h%r again on, JUaa,JrAtfc^^ 
2 and sb*~related that the child had mucus in her upper 
3 respiratory tract. Tfi**|HMHW»us- treatment had been effective 
4 sfib-vt- *e*i*»*ituted it; and then I did not* see her aftes, 
5 that^ 
6 ft Could you t e l l me from your no tes on the 14th 
7 wha1 cr w c*s~*fcha~ previous. txe.atmaa.fei^-T*e^wm#Bse? 
8 A. ftffcdgqry^Bifc* 
9 ft AncU"se^ye»-continued i t ^because— 
10 A. I t r e c u r r e d , 
11 Q. I * ^ t e c u r r e d . Beearcseri t had reso lved ' i t £y~ 
12 thft^feft? 
13 A. ¥ff!?t 
14 ft And could you explain to me what SOM is again? 
" A. "irniM^iftfciiiiil-iiiiiiiLJiiii: ~ 
16 ft And what is that? 
17 A. That is where you have fluid behind th^ r e a r ^ ^ 
19 ft And was the condition complained of on the 
20 14th the same thing; SOM, or was it something different? 
21 A. No. That was what she had on that one occasion 
22 on the 5th of November and on the 14th of December that 
23 was not present. 
24 ft AiwUfclML-iwmEla^^ — 
25 A. That the mucus was ^  pres^t^ia,, foftg. *aew. 
ADDENDUM H 
INTERROGATORY NO. 26: Identify all exhibits whi ch 
may be introduced at the trial in this case 
ANSWER: Exhibits have not been determined except 
v the medical records. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 27: Identify each pers: -bo 
will or may be calls** as an expert witnes-i vi" t.ria;. And as to 
each sr,."jte , 
Present . ass and telephone number? 
b. Medi;,'d „ or professional specie it, cr capacity; 
Educational background :luding any degrees 
certification obtained m any educational, 
honorary, or professi:n association; 
d the expert was first m acted; 
irrangement wit expert that has 
been contacted; 
T- The date tf* *; the expert was first cent. •*.:•'••• : 
concerning case. 
g. The date that expert was f i i st contacted 
concerning this case; 
I The subst.'i'iuH of expertfs expected testimony; 
the expert examined f lve deceased, and 
ii 
The date -i:.•>• ;^:h examination; 
of any persons preser 
each s examination; 
; , The nature and exte^ f each such 
examination. 
-10 
4. Whether any written report, tapes, c; i 
photographs were taken IT prepared cnr "WTIII -. 
the examinations. 
Whether the expert has previously testified 
in any prior medical malpractice actions; 
k . m' " Lit rlit -," 1! 
The caption or each such case in which, 
testimony was given, including names of parties, 
court and court case numbers. 
2 iii iLurM I'lnui subs"! MM: -a t i.esi. imony ; 
3 Name and addresses of the attorney who 
procured the testimony. 
ANSWER: 
attached as Exhibit "A." 
A C.V. attached as Exhibit "A." 
~. August -)7, 
e. Expe i £ e e a 11 ,-i ," « 11u 1 \ e 1 'I i v e 11 
established. 
f August 10, 1987. 
g. August II 0, 1987. 
h. The med :l cal! c .ar e rendered by n r. Thomas 
Nickol on July 4, 1984, and August 16 1984, was 
performed within the accepted standard of care 
required of physicians specializing :! : I emerge r J :y 
m e d i i: i i ite 
No. 
11-
ADDENDUM I 
GARY D. STOTT (A3130) 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant Dr. Thomas Nic 
CSB Tower, Suite 700 
50 S. Main St. 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERT JOHN and ANGELA 
BUTTERFIELD, 
"l I I .-. J ... Am J" 411" .ill" ..- ' ' 
i: 1 a l I K il, il Oil
 t 
VS. | 
DAVID OKUBO# M.D., et al.# 
Defendants. 
1 AFFIDAVIT OF 
i MICHAEL C. PINELL, M.D. 
i Civil No. C86-9250 
i Judge Richard Moffatt 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
rr.VNTV K P ^ L . J 
Michael C Pinell, M.D.f being first duly sworn upon his 
oath, deposes and states as 
1 I am a physician duly licensed to practice medicine in 
the State of Utah, and am board certified with the American Board of 
Family Practice Fellow American Academy of f 'ami 1 y Practice, 
American Board Emergency Medicine and Fel low American Coll eye of 
Emergency Physicians. 
My education and training are outlined in my 
Exhibit "A". 
I have been involved in the practice of medicine as an 
emergency room physician in the State of Utah during the time in 
question in the Complaint of Mr. and Mrs. John Butterfield. 1 am 
familiar with th* standard of care required of adequately-trained 
emergency medicine physicians in Salt Lake City, State »f I a 
dur i n I ", I .I" ' i<ir • 
4 Th# opinions set forth in this Affidavit are based 
my review of the medical records of Tiffany Butterfield from: 
Kenneth u Hunter; 
Okubo; 
Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital 
Inpatient record dated 6/4/84 and, 
*nergency , w,1 11111 ,,!lfii din'" e.i ' ,'1 H 4 
and 8/16/84; 
The State Medical Examiner. 
5. Sa^ed upon my review of the medical records listed 
above, and based --i •i expert IBI- An IIII i iiiei'qieiii.iy med Ik: :i ne physician, 
it I • niy opinion that the medical care rendered by Dr. Thomas 
Nickol to Tiffany Butterfield on July 4, 1 98 1 and August 16, 
1984, was performed within the accepted standard of care ?pqii1f«« I I 
physicians spec i»1 -i' ar i»w| i n emer. 
DATED this 3- H day of l*^f^[> *-r 1987. 
MICHAEL C. PINELL, M.D. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO/before me th,is 2-V day of 
, 1987. 
My Commission Expires: 
_—*/•- A $r.— 
BUTTERF2/R0SE 
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ADDENDUM J 
IN THE THIRD JUDICAL DISTRK
 V„.,HT S A L T ..„ „A 
SAiT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
ALBERT JOHN AND ANGELA 
BUTTERFIELD, as guardians 
and parents of and on 
behalf of TIFFANY RUTH 
BUTTERFIELD, 
N.nntitfs, 
-vs-
DAVID OKUBO, THOMAS NICHOL, 
and HOLY CROSS JORDAN VALLEY 
HOSPITAL, JOHN DOES l-< 
Defendants. 
t 
: 
: 
j 
AFFIDAVIT OF H.
 B A R R Y 
JACOBS, M.D. R R Y 
Civi I fj 
i 
J u d g e
 Wchard Moffatt 
:"i ! A i in- 1.11 IITAH ' ) 
County of Sa 11 Lake ) 
II* Barry Jaco 
deposes and states: being fi r s t d . x y S W o
^ on oath 
1. 1 am a physician licensed in *K 
and am a Board Certified Surgeon since I974 ^ J 6 o f dryland 
experience in Emergency Room care at four K ? h a v e Past 
Pediatrics, haying cared for patients in privfi!*1*' an<* 
hospitals, including the Children's HbapiSi JJ^JJJctici and 
2. I have reviewed the em*r„ ** iliqtoxt' B.C. 
re 
2. e gency r«« 
cords of the Decedent, Tiffiany R. Butter??^2 n d Pediatric 
positions of her Parents, Albert and i« , e l d' as we?i C 
ve met with Albert Rnt-4-Arfi'ai^ a ^Sela Bu*r.«*,r* as the 
tne ueceaenc, Tirtiany R. Butterf7Ii^"a Pediatric 
depositions  Parents, Albert  AnSff *ld' a s w ll *o „• 
ha Bu terf eld. ^Sela B tterfi!?! a s *• 
aej
-«# and 
-. I am familiar with the Standard * 
in 1984, required in pediatrics and emeroerL C a r e' apbli^v, 
well as hospital responsibility for adeoua?fy r o o m «»edicinf le 
availability of previous records durino i** record keen<„ ' a s 
a related complaint. 9 l a t e* foli o w ^ p i n 9 and 
UP care for 
4. After a thorough review of the 
the opinion that care below an acceptable
 c
a V a i l a
° l e data r 
to Tiffany Butterfield by Dr. Nichol, Dr nv.a?dard w a s rZ .am °* 
Cross Jordan Valley Hospial with the specif? °' a«<i thl 2 Vf d e d 
P e C l f l c s
 related be?ov? 
5. Assuming the facts as related in the parent1 
depositions to be true, the history of present illness and/or 
chief complaints gathered by the hospital nursing staff and Dr. 
Nichols on 07/04/84 fail to detail the fact that actual apnea was 
observed by the parents and there was cyanosis. Also omitted was 
the fact that the child required stimulation such as pinching or 
shaking before respiration was resumed. Given the lack of 
significant findings on exam to account for respiratory 
compromise and/or the apparent concern and anxiety of the 
parents, such an omission contributed directly to the failure to 
consider SIDS in a differential diagnosis 
6 When the child was taken as directed for pediatric 
evaluation on 07/16/84 by Dr. Okubo a vague reference was made 
concerning the fact that the child did have unexplained 
respiratory problems. Once again, an inadequate history lead to 
an incomplete assessment and second failure to consider the need 
to rule out SIDS as an etiological possibility. 
7. The second emergency room visit of 08/16/84 did 
contain a somewhat unclear reference to periods of apnea not 
associated with cyanosis. This is refuted by the parent's 
deposition in that the child had been observed to have cyanosis 
with the apnea and once again required stimulation while being 
transported to the hospital that did resolve the cynosis. 
3. It is alleged that the prior emergency room record of 
07/04/84 could not be obtained. Such data* should have been 
available. This would have reinforced the fact that unexplained 
respiratory problems existed and a differential diagnosis 
including SIDS should have been developed. 
9. The physical exam as recorded by Dr. Nichols on 
08/16/84 failed to note any cardiac findings. The discharge 
instructions did imply some need for monitoring the infant and 
that the child should be re-evaluated by the Pediatrician* The 
child's parents insist they did not receive any follow-up 
recommendations and therefore were unaware of the need for same. 
Fhere are no records available to detail what was 
recorded during a third emergency room visit on or about 
10/01/84. • The parent's deposition indicates the child again had 
an apneic episode and required stimulation* The deposition goes 
on to insist that a concern about SIDS was raised and discounted 
by Dr. Nichols as a possibility even though no other etiology had 
surfaced to explain the child1s problems or account for the 
degree of parental concern and/or anxiety. 
1J On 12/19/84 Tiffany Butterfield did indeed die from 
SIDS. This would easily have been avoided to a reasonable degree 
of medical certainty by either in-hospital observation and 
monitoring for apnea followed by the issuance of a home apnea 
monitorf or simp] y arranging for a home apnea monitor. 
12. while one could perhaps argue that such care was not 
warrented following the 07/04/84 emergency visit, I ara of the 
opinion that such care was justified after the 07/16/84 pediatric 
check-up and/or the 08/16/84 and 10/01/84 emergency room visits. 
Drs. Okubo and Nichols and a duty to insure necessary follow-up 
was carried out and failed to do so, 
13. The above, in my opinion, constitutes care below an 
accepted standard (negligence) and was the proximate cause of the 
child1s demise from SIDS. 
Further affiant saith naught. 
DATCl). liiiis^)_ day ot December, 1987. 
Subscribe*"! an<i vw<: t;" s^j ' day of 
December, 1987. 
Notary^Public - Residing ati 
Faye Arasim 
Reston, VA 
My Commission Expires: 
My Commission Expires May 18. t « 9 
RULES 
Kule 44 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
(c) Criteria for transfer. The Court of Appeals shall consider certifi 
only in the following cases: C*B 
(1) Cases which are of such a nature that it is apparent that thgl 
should be decided by the Supreme Court and that the Supreme 
would probably grant a petition for a writ of certiorari in the 
decided by the Court of Appeals, irrespective of how the Court of i 
might rule, and 
(2) Cases which will govern a number of other cases involving thfc ^T: 
legal issue or issues pending in the district courts, juvenile courts, c^5j 
courts, or the Court of Appeals or which are cases of first impr^?^ 
under state or federal law which will have wide applicability. ^ ^ 
Compiler's Notes. — The Advisory Com-
mittee Note to Rule 42 also applies to this rule. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — The Utah Court of Appeals, 
1988 Utah L. Rev. 150. 
Rule 44. Transfer of improperly pursued appeals. 
If a notice of appeal or a petition for review is filed in a timely manner but ii 
pursued in an appellate court that does not have jurisdiction in the case, th| 
appellate court, either on its own motion [or] on motion of any party, sha| 
transfer the case, including the record on appeal, all motions and other order* 
and a copy of the docket entries, to the court with appellate jurisdiction in tht 
case. The clerk of the transferring court shall give notice to all parties and to 
the clerk of the trial court of the order transferring the case. The time for 
filing all papers in a transferred case shall be calculated according to the time 
schedule of the receiving court. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 4C is Court of Appeals have jurisdiction over the re-
renumbered as Rule 44. It is amended to per- view of formal a<Jjudicative proceedings. Pro-
mit the transfer of an appeal that is timely but vided that all parties have notice of the intent 
improperly filed not only between the Supreme to seek judicial review, the same policy consii 
Court and Court of Appeals but also to the Dis- erations that permit the transfer of an imjm. 
trict Court. Under the Administrative Proce-
 e r l y f l l e d a p p e a l between the Supreme Court 
dures Act.the District^ Court has jurisdiction to
 a n d t h e C o u r t o f A l s g h o u l d ^ ^ 
review^nformal adjudicative proceedings of ad-
 t r a n s f e r o f 8 U c h a c a s e to t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t 
mimstrative agencies. The Supreme Court and 
TITLE VII. 
JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO COURT OF APPEALS. 
Rule 45. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of 
Court of Appeals. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a 
468 
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^e (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be 
(
'
#C
^ted by a P e t i t i o n f° r a w"* °f certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah. 
aule 46. Considerations governing review of certiorari. 
tteview by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discre-
•
 n and will be granted only for special and important reasons. The follow-
a
° '
 while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's 
!rfcretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in 
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the 
same issue of law; 
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of 
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the 
Supreme Court; 
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that 
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call 
for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision; or 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled 
by the Supreme Court. 
Rule 47. Certification and transmission of record; filing; 
parties. 
(a) Appearance, docketing fee, filing, and service. Counsel for the peti-
tioner shall, within the time provided by Rule 48, pay the certiorari docketing 
fee and file ten copies of a petition which shall comply in all respects with 
Rule 49. The case then will be placed on the certiorari docket. Counsel for the 
petitioner shall serve four copies of the petition on counsel for each party 
separately represented. It shall be the duty of counsel for the petitioner to 
notify all parties in the case of the date of filing and of the certiorari docket 
number of the case. Service and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21. 
(b) Joint and separate petitions. Parties interested jointly, severally, or 
otherwise in a decision may join in a petition for a writ of certiorari; any one 
or more of them may petition separately; or any two or more of them may join 
in a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be reviewed on certiorari 
and involve identical or closely related questions, it will suffice to file a single 
petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the cases. 
(c) Cross-petition of respondent. Counsel for a respondent wishing to file 
a cross-petition shall, within the time provided by Rule 48(d), pay the certio-
rari docketing fee and file ten copies of a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari 
which shall comply in all respects with Rule 49. The cross-petition will then 
be placed on the certiorari docket. Counsel for the cross-petitioner shall serve 
four copies of the cross-petition on counsel for each party separately repre-
sented. It shall be the duty of counsel for the cross-petitioner to notify all 
parties in the case of the date of the filing and of the certiorari docket number 
of the case. Service and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21. A cross-
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petition for a writ of certiorari may not be joined with any other filinff. 
clerk shall not accept any filing so joined. K % 
(d) Parties, All parties to the proceeding in the Court of Appeals shall 
deemed parties in the Supreme Court, unless the petitioner notifies the Cl ^ 
of the Supreme Court in writing of the petitioner's belief that one or moi* 
the parties below have no interest in the outcome of the petition. A con ** 
such notice shall be served on all parties to the proceeding below, and a nJ ^ 
noted as no longer interested may remain a party by notifying the clerk, \§ 
service on the other parties, that the party has an interest in the petiti 
(e) Motion for certification and transmission of record. A party ^ 
tending to file a petition for certiorari, prior to filing the. petition or at ^ 
time prior to action by the Supreme Court on the petition, may file a moti ' 
for an order to have the Clerk of the Court of Appeals or the clerk of the trTi 
court certify the record, or any part of it, and provide for its transmission to 
the Supreme Court. Motions to certify the record prior to action on the pet? 
tion by the Supreme Court should rarely be made, only when the record ii 
essential to the Supreme Court's proper understanding of the petition or th 
brief in opposition and such understanding cannot be derived from the co* 
tents of the petition or the brief in opposition, including the appendix. If
 a 
motion is appropriate, it shall be made to the Supreme Court after the filing of 
a petition but prior to action by the Supreme Court on the petition. In the ca^ 
of a stay of execution of a judgment of the Court of Appeals, such a motion 
may be made before the filing of the petition. Thereafter, the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court or any party to the case may request that additional parts of 
the record be certified and transmitted to the Supreme Court. Copies of all 
motions for certification and transmission shall be sent to the parties to the 
proceeding. All motions and orders shall comply with and be subject to the 
requirements of Rule 23. 
Rule 48. Time for petitioning. 
(a) Timeliness of petition. A petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed 
with the Clerk of the Supreme Court within 30 days after the entry of the 
decision by the Court of Appeals. 
(b) Refusal of petition. The clerk will refuse to receive any petition for a 
writ of certiorari which is jurisdictionally out of time. 
(c) Effect of petition for rehearing. The time for filing a petition for a 
writ of certiorari runs from the date the decision is entered by the Court of 
Appeals, not from the date of the issuance of the remittitur. If, however, a 
petition for rehearing is timely filed by any party, the time for filing the 
petition for a writ of certiorari for all parties runs from the date of the denial 
of rehearing or of the entry of a subsequent decision entered upon the rehear-
ing. 
(d) Time for cross-petition. 
(1) A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed: 
(A) within the time provided in subdivisions (a) and (c) of this rule; 
or 
(B) within 30 days of the filing of the petition for a writ of certio-
rari. 
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(2) Any cross-petition timely only pursuant to paragraph (d)(1)(B) of 
this rule will not be granted unless a timely petition for a writ of certio-
rari of another party to the case is granted. 
te) Extension of time. The Supreme Court, upon a showing of excusable 
lect
 o r g00d cause, may extend the time for filing a petition or a cross-
tition for a writ of certiorari upon motion filed not later than 30 days after 
*he expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph (a) or (c) of this rule, 
hichever is applicable. Any such motion which is filed before expiration of 
!l e prescribed time may be ex parte, unless the Supreme Court otherwise 
qUires. Notice of any such motion which is filed after expiration of the 
^escribed time shall be given to the other parties. No extension shall exceed 
30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order 
^ranting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
gule 49. Petition for writ of certiorari. 
(a) Contents. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall contain, in the order 
indicated: 
(1) A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is 
sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case in the Su-
preme Court contains the names of all parties. 
(2) A table of contents with page references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, agency rules, court rules, statutes, and authorities 
cited, with references to the pages of the petition where they are cited. 
(4) The questions presented for review, expressed in the terms and 
circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement 
of the questions should be short and concise and should not be argumenta-
tive or repetitious. General conclusions, such as "the decision of the Court 
of Appeals is not supported by the law or facts," are not acceptable. The 
statement of a question presented will be deemed to comprise every sub-
sidiary question fairly included therein. Only the questions set forth in 
the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the Supreme 
Court. 
(5) A reference to the official and unofficial reports of any opinions 
issued by the Court of Appeals. 
(6) A concise statement of the grounds on which the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court is invoked, showing: 
(A) the date of the entry of the decision sought to be reviewed; 
(B) the date of the entry of any order respecting a rehearing and 
the date of the entry and terms of any order granting an extension of 
time within which to petition for certiorari; 
(C) reliance upon Rule 47(c), where a cross-petition for a writ of 
certiorari is filed, stating the filing date of the petition for a writ of 
certiorari in connection with which the cross-petition is filed; and 
(D) the statutory provision believed to confer on the Supreme 
Court jurisdiction to review the decision in question by a writ of 
certiorari. 
(7) Controlling provisions of constitutions, statutes, ordinances, and 
regulations that the case involves, setting them out verbatim and giving 
the appropriate citation. If the controlling provisions involved are 
471 
Rule 49 UTAH RULES OP APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
lengthy, their citation alone will suffice at this point and their perti 
text shalf be set forth in the appendix referred to in subparagraph do?* 
this paragraph. ,Qf 
(8) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate bri A 
the nature of the case, the course of the proceedings, and ite dispositiJ!• 
the lower courts. There shall follow a statement of the facts relevant ** 
the issues presented for review. All statements of fact and references ^ 
the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record and * 
the opinion of the Court of Appeals, *° 
(9) With respect to each question presented, a direct and concise arch. 
ment explaining the special and important reasons as provided in Rufe^! 
for the issuance of the writ. ^ 
(10) An appendix containing, in the following order: 
(A) copies of all opinions, including concurring and dissenting 
opinions, and all orders, including any order on rehearing, deliver^ 
by the Court of Appeals in rendering the decision sought to be re. 
viewed; 
(B) copies of any other opinions, findings of fact, conclusions of la^ 
orders, judgments, or decrees that were rendered in the case or in 
companion cases by the Court of Appeals and by other courts or by 
administrative agencies and that are relevant to the questions pre-
sented. Each document shall include the caption showing the name of 
the issuing court or agency, the title and number of the case, and the 
date of its entry; and 
(C) any other judicial or administrative opinions or orders that are 
relevant to the questions presented but were not entered in the case 
that is the subject of the petition. 
If the material that is required by subparagraphs (7) and (10) of this para-
graph is voluminous, such may, if more convenient, be separately presented. 
(b) Form of petition. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall comply with 
the form of a brief as specified in Rule 27. The cover of the petition shall be 
white. The clerk shall examine all petitions before filing, and if a petition is 
not prepared in accordance with Rule 27 and this paragraph, it will not be 
filed, but shall be returned to be properly prepared. 
(c) No separate brief. All contentions in support of a petition for a writ of 
certiorari shall be set forth in the body of the petition, as provided in subpara-
graph (a)(9) of this rule. No separate brief in support of a petition for a writ of 
certiorari will be received, and the clerk will refuse to file any petition for a 
writ of certiorari to which is annexed or appended any supporting brief. 
(d) Page limitation. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall be as short as 
possible, but may not exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index, the table 
of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by subparagraph (a)(7) of 
this rule, and the appendix. 
(e) Absence of accuracy, brevity, and clarity. The failure of a petitioner 
to present with accuracy, brevity, and clarity whatever is essential to a ready 
and adequate understanding of the points requiring consideration will be a 
sufficient reason for denying the petition. 
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